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Someday I will be dead, and maybe you will want to know about the media I consumed or wanted to consume. Furthermore, while I am still living, perhaps you want ideas on gifts you could give me. Well, either way, you've come to the right place.
Notes on “Was the Best Defense a Good Offense? Jefferson Davis and Confederate Strategies” from TMS by McPherson.
Common Historical Opinion on Why CSA lost: Davis’ poor relationships with Western Theater generals Joseph Johnston and P.T. Beauegard and favoritism towards Braxton Bragg and John Bell Hood led to disaster in the West, where the CSA undeniably lost the war. His good relationship with Lee led to the many successes in the Eastern Theater. “In the end, this and other rifts between Davis and his Western-theater generals more than outweighed the positive results gained by the ‘powerful team’ of Lee and Davis.”
While personal problems certainly had a hand in the CSA lost, it must be recognized that Lincoln also had many problems with various generals. Also, this is another example of an “internal” argument which doesn’t give weight to the context, ie the interaction between North and South.
“Although the personalities and the relationships among the commanders in chief and their principal army commanders in both Confederacy and Union had an important impact on the outcome of the war, a focus on strategy rather than personalities might yield a better understanding of the CSA defeat.”
Military studies often focus on victors, but two notable exceptions are studies of Nazi Germany and the CSA, which lost their wars but performed brilliantly in many operations.
“Wars have a tendency to take on a character and momentum that become increasingly incompatible with the original war aims. The most successful wars in American history have been tose with a close congruity between policy and strategies. “
“During the Civil War, Northern war aims as well as national and military strategies changed and the conflict expanded from a limited war intended to restore the antebellum status quo in a ‘hard war’ intended to destroy enemy resources including slavery…to bring an end to the social order sustained by slavery, and to give the United States a ‘new birth of freedom.’ “
Lincoln: “I will hold McClellan’s horse if he will only bring us succes.”
Davis: “We seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of any kind from the states with which we were lately confederated; all we ask is to be let alone.”
The CSA began the war firmly in control of basically all of its territory, 750,000 sq. miles, a functioning government, and a strong army — this is rarely the case in civil wars. At first, Davis seemed to envision a purely defensive strategy, bent on survival and attrition to wear out the Northern aggressors. “There are no vital points on the preservation of which the continued existence of the Confederacy depends. Not the fall of Richmond, nor Wilmington, nor Charleston, nor Savannah, nor of all combined, can save the enemy from the constant and exhaustive drain of blood and treasure which must continue until he shall discover that no peace is attainable unless based on the recognition of our indefeasable rights.” But this was said in 1864, after the CSA had survived the loss of territory and cities. At first, Confederate nationalism was fragile. The CSA was founded as a confederation of independent and sovereign states, after all.
An important strategy was Davis’ preference for brigading troops by states, meaning CSA forces were spread throughout the perimeter rather than being more concentrated in several points. The danger of this dispersal (“extended defense”) was that it was easier for the enemy to concentrate on an area of weakness and break through, which is exactly what happened. In response, as the war went on, the CSA learned the value of interior lines and were able to concentrate in space, bringing in reinforcements to counter enemy incursions.
These counter-thrusts ushered in a new era of CSA strategy, an era “offense-defense.” “The best defense is a good offense.” Lee: “There is nothing to be gained by this army remaning quietly on the defensive.”
The question was: should the CSA remain defensive and conduct a campaign of survival, hoping to test the patience and will of the North; OR, did the CSA need concrete military victories to scare the North into accepting CSA independence.
“Johnston would have fought the crucial battle of the campaign on Key West.”
Another main strategy point: Eastern Theater vs. Western Theater.
“What we do know is that Lee was far from perceiving Virginia as the most important theater. While it may be true that the CSA lost the war in the West, it is also clear that Lee’s victories in the East came close on several occasions to winning the war.”
In conclusion we may ask if a more dispersed strategy, more emphasis on the West, better relations between Davis and his generals would have won the war. Yet all of these things did not exist in a vacuum but in the context of related issues in the North. “When someone thought to ask George Pickett after the war who he thought was responsible for the Confederate defeat, he reflected for a moment and famously replied: ‘I always thought the Union army had something to do with it.’ “
Books to read…
The Confederate Nation: 1861-1865 by Emory Thomas
Jefferson Davis’s Generals, ed. Gabor Boritt
The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant by J.F.C. Fuller
Why The North Won by Archer and Hattaway
Why the North Won the Civil War by David Herbert Donald
