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Notes from “The Confederacy: A House Divided?” from This Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War by James McPherson.
Main interpretive branches on the outcome of the war…
INTERNAL - Why did the South Lose? (focuses mainly on CSA)
EXTERNAL - Why or how did the North win (considers both USA and CSA)
Lee, upon surrendering, offered an external explanation: “We have been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.” To this day, this is a popular interpretation of what happened.
The question is: did the CSA ever have a chance? At the outset, they understood the superior numbers and resources of the north. Was the Civil War an insane, immoral act of suicide or homicide? McPherson notes the instances in history in which an inferior group warred for independence and defeated a much more powerful enemy (U.S. vs Great Britain; Vietnam vs. U.S.)
Behind the Lines in the Southern Confederacy, by Charles W. Ramdsell. Southern leaders failed to solve problems of economic mobilization and war finance which led to runaway inflation, food shortages, etc., which weakened and detached the civilian population and made it unable to give effective support for the war effort. The CSA began “to crumble, or break down within, long before the military situation appeared to be desperate.” Furthermore, a significant portion of the population had no great interest in a CSA victory: slaves, who comprised 2/5 of the Southern population, and another 2/5 were members of non-slaveholding families.
William Freehling, in The South vs. The South, somewhat disagrees, saying that many non-slaveholding families still supported and had a vested interest in a Confederate victory. Still, according to him, half of all Southerners opposed the Confederacy and this sufficiently explains the CSA failure.
McPherson calls into question Freehling’s 50/50 explanation, pointing out that slaves still produced work during the war which contributed to the CSA economy and army and other factors (border states, etc). McPherson puts it more at 75/25.
Another internal interpretation was offered by William C. Davis in Look Away: A History of the CSA. According to Davis, the defeat should be attributed to poor political leadership from governors, CSA gov (Jeff David, Alex Stephens), and strife between factions and individuals within the CSA. In other words, petty bickering and in-fighting prevented the CSA from fully facing the enemy.
McPherson however notes that the North was plagued with similar problems of rivalries and ineffective leadership, perhaps only mitigated by Lincoln’s unwavering determination and skill. McPherson also thinks David relies too heavily on his sources, which include many newspaper editorials, congressional debates, personal letters, etc., which emphasize the bad and overlook the good. “The historian needs to stop back and gain some perspective on these sources, to recognize that the well-greased wheel that turns smoothly also turns quietly, leaving less evidence of its existence for the historian.”
Yet we must acknowledge that the CSA lasted 4 years, despite overwhelming death and destruction. Something must have been working, and something must have existed within a great number of individuals to allow it to continue despite such violence. “Confederate armies suffered proportional casualty rates twice as high as Union armies and several times greater than American armies in any other war this country has fought. Yet the CSA kept fighting until it almost literally had nothing left to fight with in 1865.”
Good “external” study: Gary W. Gallagher, The Confederate War
